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Substantive Law Aspects of
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Between Foreigners in France:
The Competence Question
Clearly one of the most troublesome problems in the French law of
enforcement of foreign judgments is determining precisely the content of the
condition of enforcement, laid down by the Cour de Cassation in the
landmark case, Munzer v. Dame Jacoby-Munzer, I that the foreign tribunal was
competent. The complexity of the issue may be increased in the case of an
attempt to enforce a foreign judgment between foreigners in which there are no
contacts with France on the merits.
When the French court in such a case takes the position that the test is
whether the foreign court was competent according to French rules for the
attribution of international competence, the party seeking enforcement is
essentially in the position of having to show that if the events giving rise to the
litigation had taken place in France rather than in the country rendering the
foreign judgment, the French courts would have been competent. Obviously
application of such a standard greatly restricts possibilities for enforcement
when the foreign law is considerably more developed and actions giving rise to
liability are more clearly defined than in French law. Such is the relationship,
for example, between United States and French law of securities regulation. A
hypothetical problem will illustrate the difficulty.
I. Hypothetical Problem
Boite, S.A. (hereinafter Boite), a Belgian corporation with siege social
(principal office) in Brussels and assets worth $100 million, negotiated and
*LL.M., Columbia University (1974); University of Virginia (1973); Member, New York Bar;
Jervey Fellow in Foreign Law, Columbia University.
'91 J. DR. INT'L 302 (1964) (Cass. civ. Ire). The court enumerated five conditions for enforcement
of foreign judgments: "the competence of the foreign tribunal which rendered the decision, the
regularity of the procedure followed in the proceeding, the application of the competent law
following French conflicts rules, conformity to international ordre public (public policy) and
absence of all fraud on the court." Id. at 303-04.
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contracted with Can Co., Inc. (hereinafter Canco), a New York corporation
registered under Section 12 (g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for the
purchase of all of Canco's assets valued at $25 million solely in exchange for
Boite common stock. By a provision of the contract, New York law applied.
Boite filed the forms required under the United States securities laws, including
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and mailed
prospectuses to all Canco shareholders from New York. Subsequently, Canco's
shareholders approved the sale and Boite presented the stock for acceptance in
New York pursuant to the contract. Canco accepted the Boite shares,
distributed them to its shareholders and dissolved.
S, a Canadian national domiciled in Montreal and a former Canco share-
holder, received 2,000 Botte shares valued at $200,000 ($100 per share) at
the time of the exchange. Three days later a Belgian court handed down a
judgment for one billion Belgian francs ($25 million) against Boite and Boite's
stock fell to $10 per share, at which level it has been ever since. S sued Boite in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging material omission
for Bote's failure to disclose the litigation which had been pending at the time
of the registration.
Boite's corporate directors were served personally at the corporate
headquarters in Brussels pursuant to Section 27 of the 1934 Act. Boite failed to
appear and the court rendered a default judgment of $180,000 against Bolte. S
seeks advice on enforcement of the judgment against Bolte's deposit account at
the Banque Nationale de Paris in Paris (hereafter "BNP"). Specifically, he
wants to know whether he can have provisional relief in France on the basis of
the American judgment and if a French court will regard the United States
court sitting in New York as having been competent for the purpose of obtaining
an exequatur. (enforcement judgment).
II. Summary Conclusions: Salsle-Arrt and Exequatur
Although provisional relief in the form of saisie-arrt is available to S, and the
French courts would be competent to hear the action for enforcement, it is not
clear whether the foreign judgment would be enforced, the potential objection
being lack of competence of the United States District Court in New York.
A. Saisie-Arrt
Saisie-arrt (garnishment) is "the procedure by which the creditor attaches,
in the hands of a third party, funds or movable property which the third party
owes to the creditor's debtor, and objects to the return thereof."2 According to
1L. CRfM1EU, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE ET VOLES D'ExfcuTIoN § 159
(1956).
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Article 557 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the saisie-arrt remedy is available to
all creditors. S, being a judgment creditor of Bolte, is qualified to seek an
attachment within the broad statutory framework. Just as there is a creditor-
debtor relationship between S and Boite, it also exists between Boite and the
BNP, by virtue of BNP's holding Bolte's funds on deposit. 3 Despite the fact that
the real parties in interest, S and Boite, are foreigners, the French courts are
competent. 4 Finally, it is a well established rule now confirmed by the Cour de
Cassation in Selzner, I that a foreign judgment without exequatur is sufficient
documentary evidence to obtain provisional relief without court order.
Thus, S should be able to utilize the saisie-arrt procedure even though this is
essentially a dispute between foreigners with no relation to France other than
the fact that the debtor Boite has a deposit account at the BNP in Paris. At a
minimum S should get the protection of having the fund frozen while he seeks
an exequatur in France. If all goes well, including the exequatur proceeding, S
can also utilize the execution phase of saisie-arrt to compel payment by the
BNP. In short, saisie-arrt, although admittedly cumbersome and somewhat
unsettled by the Code's failure to address itself to the situation of attachment
between foreigners, thereby necessitating recourse to sparse case law and
treatises, satisfies the plaintiff's needs.
B. Exequatur
The French courts are competent in exequatur cases between foreigners
"when the enforcing judgment must necessarily produce its effects in
France . .. ," 6 a condition fulfilled in the hypothetical case by offering proof of
Boite's deposit account at the BNP. As for the question of internal or special
competence, it is the civil court, more precisely, the tribunal de grande instance
at Paris, whicn is competent.'
in Munzer, the Cour de Cassation listed competence of the foreign tribunal
as the first requirement for enforcement of a foreign judgment, but the court
has never declared what the test of competence should be. Thus, the lower
courts are free to formulate an appropriate test. The hypothetical case,
moreover, presents a situation in which the French court might well want to
apply a restrictive test in view of the rather extraordinary scope of United States
securities laws in comparison with those of France.
The essential point in dispute is whether the French court, confronted with a
request to enforce a foreign judgment, should determine the foreign tribunal's
'See P. CUCHE & J. VINCENT, VOIES D'ExAcUTION ET PROCEDURES DE DISTRIBUTION § 121 (9th
ed. 1966); M. LABORDE-LACOSTE, Exposf MTHODIQUE DES VO'IEs D'ExEcUTION § 312 (1952).
'See 4 E. GARSONNET & CEZAR-BRU, TRAITf THEORIQUE ET PRACTIQUE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE
ET COMMERCIALE §§ 169 n.3, 473 (3d ed. 1913).
'Selzner v Sanchez, 96 J. DR. INT'L 674 (1969).
'Dame veuve Ghan v. Orloff, 1928 D.P. II. 49 (Trib. civ. de Seine-et-Marne).
'2 H. BATIFFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRiv9 § 741 (5th ed. 1971).
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international competence under French rules of competence or under the law of
the country in which the tribunal sits. Bartin adopted the, first view.
In his formulation of the text, "the French court will consider the foreign
court generally competent, if the facts grounding the foreign court's court's
competence, which, by hypothesis, occurred in the foreign country, would have
conferred, if they had occurred in France, competence on the French court. 8
Significantly, the French courts applied the Bartin analysis in every commercial
case before the Munzer decision in 1964. The modern view, on the other hand,
is to apply the rules of competence of the country in which the rendering court
sits. Significantly fewer pre-Munzer cases took this approach, and all those
doing so involved requests for enforcement of foreign judgments relating to
personal status.
I. Recent Cases on International Competence
Post-Munzer case law has only brought more confusion. Gunzburg v. Dame
Schrey9 involved a request for exequatur for a Mexican divorce judgment
between Schrey, a former French national naturalized as a United States
citizen, and Gunzburg, a dual national of France and the United States. The
general competence of the French courts, however, had been waived by the
parties' voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the Mexican court.
On the international competence question the Paris Cour dAppel stated that,
while "the French court cannot regain competence over the divorce action, it
does not thereby surrender (contrary to the appellant's contention) the
determination of the international competence of the forum court in which suit
is filed, but retains in this area of competence an authority following the
principles established under French private international law. . ."1 The
court's decision was to deny exequatur on three alternate grounds: lack of
international competence of the Mexican court; failure to apply the proper
choice of law under French conflicts rules; and fraud on the court (abuse of
process).
D~prez in a case note on Gunzburg observes that "the decision opts for the
most strict solution . . ., a formula which, certainly, does not return
unconditionally to French municipal rules of competence, but which signifies
that it is necessary to search in the matter 'for the existence of a connecting
factor of the kind positively justifying the international competence of the
foreign jurisdiction,' this factor being domicile."" Bredin in another case note
concludes: "One cannot thus say that the Paris Court ... submits to firmly
'1 E. BARTIN, PRINCIPLES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Paivi § 208 (1930).
"91 J. DR. INT'L 810 (1964) (Cour d'appel, Paris).
"'Id. at 811.
"156 R.C.D.I.P. 340, 350 (1967).
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established case law. The discussion, which the supreme court has not settled,
remains open." 2
Having opted for "the most strict solution" in Gunzburg, the Paris Cour
d'Appel adhered to its position in a recent case, Dame Tourasse v. Langevin, 13
involving an attempt to enforce an Algerian divorce judgment. Langevin
asserted that Mrs. Tourasse had waived her Civil Code Article 14 privilege of
suing in a French court by her failure to seek final review of the original
Algerian judgment overruling her plea to jurisdiction and her having then
litigated the matter on the merits before the rendering court.
The court held, however, that "while Mrs. Tourasse could waive the privilege
accorded to French nationals by Article 14 of the Civil Code, such a waiver is
without effect insofar as it concerns the application of French rules of private
international law designating the foreign court internationally competent to
hear litigation in a matter involving French public policy ... " " Thus, the court
found no waiver of the right to renew the jurisdictional plea in opposition to an
application for exequatur, because French rules for the attribution of
international competence were a matter of French public policy under the
circumstances. The court applied the French rule-competence of the court of
the marital domicile-found said domicile to have been in Algeria and affirmed
the judgment of enforcement.
In Dame Tourasse the Paris Cour d 'Appel took the position that the French
defendant in a foreign divorce proceeding cannot by waiver of Article 14 rights
preclude the French court presented with a request for enforcement from
applying French rules in international competence, notably the rule of the
marital domicile. The same court, however, has indicated that failure to bring a
divorce action at the marital domicile does not violate international public
policy when the proceedings are between foreigners. In 1958 the court in
Lundwall v. Dame Villada y Sanchez"5 looked only to Cuban law in enforcing a
Cuban divorce judgment despite the fact that it was "not contested that the
conjugal domicile, which, immediately after the marriage was established at
Salzburg in Austria was still there when Mine. Villeda y Sanchez, who had gone
back to her family in Cuba filed a petition for divorce in the Court of
Almendares ... "16
This recent tendency to apply French rules of international competence in
personal status cases has been complemented by an extraordinary decision in a
commercial case, Soci~t~s Mack Worldwide et Mack Trucks v. Compagnie
12 91 J. DR. INT'L at 816.
'160 R.C.D.I.P. 541 (1971) (Paris Cour d'appel, Ire ch. suppl.).
"Id. at 542.
'185 J. DR. INT'L 1016 (1958) Paris Cour d'appel, Ire ch. suppl.).
"Id. at 1019.
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Financidre Pour le Commerce Extirieur (COFICOMEX), ' applying foreign
rules of competence to enforce a Swiss judgment in favor of a Swiss plaintiff
against an American defendant. The Paris Cour d'Appel rejected the American
corporation's plea for application of French rules of international competence.
The court stated:
Whereas it is true that international competence is determined by extension of rules of
internal territorial competence when it is a question, for a French court, of ruling on
its own competence in litigation filed therein in the first instance, it is fitting on the
other hand, for the judge charged with ruling on a request for exequatur, to determine
the international competence of the foreign court by applying more liberal principles
of private French international law in this domain, which arise from custom as well as
the statutory provisions; indeed a foreign court could hardly be required, under pen-
alty of refusal to give exequatur to its decision, to apply such provisions of the mu-
nicipal law of another country; whenever the French rule for resolution of conflicts ofjurisdiction does not assign exclusive competence to the French courts,. it suffices, for a
foreign court to be recognized as competent, that the litigation be connected in a
sufficient manner to the country in whose court suit was filed, that is to say that the
choice of courts is neither arbitrary, nor artificial, nor fraudulent .... 11
The court proceeded to note the contacts between Switzerland and the
litigation, observing that Coficomex had its siege at Geneva where it carried
various activities, and that the contractual offers in question had been accepted
at Geneva. Thus, the court found that "the domicile of one of the parties and
the place of conclusion of the contracts litigated being in Switzerland, the choice
of the Geneva court is justified by the existence of a sufficient contact between
the litigation and the country of the court seized. ... '9 As Huet observes in a
case note, this is truly "a revolutionary decision,"' 20 clearly contrary to past
practice in commercial cases.
Returning to our hypothetical case, Sociit&s Mack is an encouraging case for
S. But it must be recognized that the factor of domicile of the plaintiff, an
element very significant in the United States, in particular, New York, conflicts
of law cases as well, 2' is lacking in the hypothetical case, S being a Canadian
national and domiciliary of Montreal. Thus, S must be advised that the
competence of the United States court from the standpoint of French law is by
no means certain. Under the facts of the hypothetical case, one would have to be
prepared to prove competence under French rules of international competence.
In the case of litigation between foreigners this essentially means showing that if
the events giving rise to the litigation had taken place in France as opposed to
the country where it was initiated, the French courts would have been
competent.




"See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Of course in light of Socijts Mack one would first want to argue the
sufficient-contacts theory. If the court refused to adhere to the
sufficient-contacts test, or if it adhered but found the contacts insufficient,
there are at least three possible theories of French court competence in the case
of a failure to disclose material information in a merger transaction case in the
form of a sale of assets in exchange for stock between a foreign acquiring
corporation and a French acquired corporation. The French securities laws may
give rise to a cause of action. Article 420 of the Code of Civil Procedure might be
invoked to confer jurisdiction on the French commercial courts if the dispute is
one arising in connection with the execution and performance of a contract.
Finally, it might be argued that the failure to disclose constituted fraud, giving
rise to tort liability under Articles 1382-1384 of the Civil Code.
IV. Sufficient Contacts
Under the modern approach to the resolution of competence problems in
connection with the enforcement of foreign judgments, the principal thrust has
been to move away from strict application of the French rules of international
competence toward a test more compatible with international public policy.
Thus, recent writers like Niboyet22 and Batiffo 23 have suggested measuring
competence in accordance with the law of the country rendering the original
decision. Application of such a standard coupled with the other Munzer
requirements for enforcement, notably conformity to international public
policy,24 seems sufficient protection against ridiculous assertions of foreign
court competence. The decision in Sociitgs Mack represents the first time a
French court has taken a more modern approach in a commercial case. In
effect, the Paris Cour d'Appel in seeking to determine whether "the litigation is
connected in a sufficient manner to the country whose court has been seized" 5
has taken a modified modern approach, not looking solely to either French or
foreign law but in general to the sufficiency of contacts.
Overall, the contacts in Socigtgs Mack were rather strong. The court observes
that "'Coficomex' had its sige at Geneva, where it is listed on the commercial
register, pays its taxes, conducts operations on premises of more than 400
square meters and carries out financial operations within the scope of its
corporate purpose; that, on the other hand, the representation contracts were
concluded at Geneva, since the offers of Mack Worldwide, contained in its
letters of February 8 and October 20, 1964, addressed to 'Coficomex' at
Geneva, had been accepted in that city by the representative of the company
226 J.-P. NIBOYET, TRAIT9 DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvE FRANCAIS § 1952 (1950).
22 H. BATIFFOL, supra note 7, at § 719.
2 See note I supra.
2100 J. DR. INT'L at 242.
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who signed one of the two copies of the letters .... ,,"6 Thus, the court could rely
on domicile of the plaintiff and place of contracting as contacts.
Furthermore, the court indicates the Swiss court was competent even under
French rules, namely Article 420 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for
the competence of the court in the place where payment is made. While the
agreements did not specify the place where payment was to be made, Coficomex
received notice of a payment of $37,500 to its bank account in Switzerland and a
check for $15,327.55 had been carried over to Coficomex's account. From these
facts the court concludes "that the contracting parties were in accord, at least
tacitly, for payments have taken place in Switzerland" 7
On the whole it seems rather dubious that S could show sufficient interests
between the United States and the litigation to satisfy the French court. As the
following discussion indicates, the broad jurisdiction asserted by the courts in
the United States in the name of securities regulation is virtually nonexistent in
France. It is foreseeable that the French court would find the United States
court's exercise of jurisdiction for the benefit of a Canadian national based on
the transactions in New York too extraordinary to merit enforcement.
V. French Law of Securities Regulation
French law regulating transactions in securities remains primitive in
comparison with United States law. Given this more relaxed French attitude
toward the subject, it would be difficult to convince the French judge of the
competence of the American court on the basis of sufficiency of contacts and
impossible to establish that a similar cause of action would exist under the
French regulatory scheme if the events complained of had taken place in
France. Indeed, it is scarcely possible that a transaction such as that described
in the hypothetical case could be effected in France.
With respect to the original six members of the European Community, Stein
observes that international fusions (mergers) "between companies of different
nationalities have been unknown thus far in all of the member states.""8 In
France an international merger is lawful, but in the case of acquisition of a
French company by a foreign company, the unanimous consent of the French
company shareholders is required, a condition not easily fulfilled where
shareholders are numerous and widespread. 2 9 A further impediment to
international merger between companies under different legal systems was
"Id.
7 d. at 243.
2
"E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 371 (1971).
291d. at 383 n.177.
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added by a 1968 decree3" amending Article 306-2 of the 1967 Decree on
Commercial Companies3 ' which now provides:
In the event of a proposed merger between companies only one of which is subject to
the law of July 24, 1967 on commercial companies, the merger proposal may not be
filed with the clerk of the commercial court nor may it be given the publicity referred
to in Article 255 of this decree before the other company or companies are also subject
to the above-mentioned law.
Putting aside the practical problems of effecting such a transaction in France,
the French law on commercial companies does not provide for any disclosure by
the acquiring company to the acquired company and its shareholders. The
disclosure which is required is directed toward informing the acquiring
company of the value of the acquired company. Apparently, the French have
neglected the other side of the problem, i.e., providing the acquired
shareholders with sufficient, reliable information about the acquiring company.
The 1966 Law on Commercial Companies32 provides for shareholder approval
by both companies concerned.33 The auditors of each company are required to
submit a report on the terms of the merger, particularly on the payment for
contributions of the surviving company.
The heart of disclosure is Article 254 of the 1967 Decree which provides:
The plan of merger or split-up shall be drawn up by the board of directors, the
directorate, or the managers, as the case may be, either of each of the companies
involved in the merger or of the company whose split-up is proposed.
The plan must contain the following particulars:
1. The reasons, purposes, and terms of the merger or split-up;
2. The dates as of which the companies' financial statements used to establish the
terms of the transactions were prepared;
3. A statement and valuation of the assets and liabilities, conveyance of which to the
surviving or new companies is provided for;
4. The exchange ratios;
5. The expected value of the merger or split-up premium.
The plan or a statement attached thereto shall describe the methods of valuation
used and give the reasons for selection of the exchange ratios.
Thus, while valuation of the assets and liabilities of the acquired company is to
be furnished to the acquiring company, no such information need flow in the
other direction. Furthermore, the legislative history of the valuation provision
suggests that the statement of assets and liabilities of the acquired company is
only intended as an indication and not a definitive declaration of the actual
3Decree No. 68-25 of Jan. 2, 1968, [1968] J.O. 524, C. CoM. 976 (69e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz
1973).
3 Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, [19671 J.0. 2843, C. CoM. 918.3 Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.0. 6402, C. CoM. 824.
"Art. 376.
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financial condition. This interpretation arises from the fact that the 1967 text
which provided "a designation et l'6valuation de l'actif et du passif qui seront
transmis aux soci~t6s absorbantes ou nouvelles" was amended in 1968 to read
"la designation et l'6valuation de l'actif et du passif dont la transmission aux
socidt6s absorbantes ou nouvelles est preVue." '34
As required by Article 255, this valuation statement, the exchange ratio, a
statement of the expected value of the merger and a few other formalities are to
be published in a legal announcement. According to Article 256, the board of
each company must furnish its auditors with the merger plan at least 45 days
prior to the shareholders' meeting. Article 257 requires that the auditors' report
be filed at the registered office of the company and made available to the
shareholders for fifteen days preceding the shareholders meeting. No private
cause of action for damages is given in connection with any of these
requirements.
Beyond establishing the most general principle that merger transactions are
subject to government regulation, the substantive French securities law affords
little assistance in establishing that a French court would have been competent
if Bote had effected a merger with a French company without disclosure to that
company's shareholders of the litigation pending against it.
VI. Article 420
Having found the French commercial law governing international mergers,
and more particularly disclosure to the acquired corporation shareholders, to be
of little utility in establishing a cause of action in France, one might consider
constructing a cause of action under Article 420 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
That article provides:
The plaintiff may sue, at his choice, in the court of the domicile of the defendant; in
the court of the place in which the promise was made and the merchandise delivered;
or in the court of the place where payment was to be made.
Initially, the provision appears promising since under the facts of the
hypothetical case, the merger transaction was negotiated and concluded in New
York and the payment (stock) was delivered in New York. It is unlikely that the
"merchandise" was actually "delivered" in New York since the assets of the
acquired corporation consist of both real and personal property and are not
entirely susceptible to transport but at a minimum they were put at Boite's
disposal and title passed in New York. In any case the last requirement of
payment in the place where suit is brought seems sufficient to satisfy Article 420
since the provisions are not cumulative. Thus, if these events had taken place in
France, arguably the French commercial court would have been competent.
3
"Baudeu & Bellargent, Fusion de societfs. VI bis JURIS-CLASSEUR DES SOCIeT6S, pt. 184C, §§
17, 31
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Article 420 is a useful provision, as the French courts have frequently referred
to it as a measure of the international competence of a foreign tribunal,
especially in commercial cases arising under the Franco-Sardinian Convention
of March 24, 1760 and an interpretative Declaration of September 11, 1860. 3s
The typical case, however, involves the sale of goods for money, the Cour de
Cassation having specifically denied the applicability of Article 420 in a case
arising from a dispute over an employment contract. 36 The approach has never
been taken in a merger case.
Text writers and the courts have a tendency to state a general rule that Article
420 is applicable in all cases involving commercial contracts with the exception
of insurance contract cases which are governed by special statute.37 The general
rule, however, may be misleading. Cuche and Vincent note:
But it is not necessary to go further and say that the exceptional competence of
Article 420 is applicable in all commercial litigation, even from litigation arising from
willful or negligent torts or quasi-contracts of a commercial nature.
It is necessary to return, for all litigation of this nature, to the competence of the
court of the defendant's domicile; it is the same when the existence of the agreement is
seriously contested.3"
Thus, it becomes important to distinguish whether or not the liability sought to
be imposed actually derives from the contract. If the source of liability appears
to be outside the contract, Article 420 is inapplicable. Reference to the cases is
useful in understanding the limitation.
An early case limiting the scope of Article 420 was Compagnie des Bateaux a
Vapeur du Rhone les Aigles v. Silvestre. 9 Plaintiff Silvestre sued the defendant
steamship company for damage to his raft, alleged to have resulted from the
defendant's negligent operation of its steamship, in the court in Avignon where
the plaintiff alleged that the company's agent resided rather than the court of
Lyons, the company's siege social. The trial court and the intermediate
appellate court at Ntmes upheld the plaintiff's theory of competence.
The company appealed to the Cour de Cassation, asserting the incompetence
of the court at Avignon on several grounds, one of them being the unavailability
of Article 420.
Apparently, the defendant company's branch at Avignon had entered into an
insurance contract there and paid its premiums there. Defendant argued that
3
'Depretis v. Lowengard, 24 J. DR. INT'L 797 (1897) (Cour d'appel Lyon); Laura v. Herv4, 1909
D.P. 1. 61. See also Shepherd's Bush Exhibition v. Vry, 44 J. DR. INT'L 1405 (1917) (Trib. civil de
la Seine, Ire ch.) for a case involving enforcement of a British judgment. Contra Tr~sic v.
Pompanon, 25 R.D.I.P. 288.(1930) (Cour de Paris), refusing to apply Article 420 as a rule of
international competence.
"°See text accompanying notes 40-41 infra.
"See P. CucHE, supra note 3, at 294.381d.
"11858] D.P. 1. 130 (Cass. civ.).
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the making of such payments was not sufficient for plaintiff to invoke Article
420. In quashing the lower court decision, the Cour de Cassation necessarily
concurred in the unavailability of Article 420. The case clearly establishes that
Article 420 does not extend to purely personal and civil actions to enforce tort
liability, not a surprising result since the plaintiff himself had no contact at all
with the'defendant.
In an 1862 decision, the Cour de Cassation in Salvaja et Basso v. Compagnie
dAssurance La Confiance40 upheld a decision of the Cour Impgriale of Paris
refusing to enforce two default judgments of the commercial court of Genoa.
The plaintiffs, domiciled in Genoa, were general agents of La Confiance, a fire
insurance company with sikge in Paris. The basis of their complaint was the
company's action in discharging them. The court held that the employment
contract in question did not come within Article 420, "since it is a question
neither of sale nor of delivery, nor of payment for merchandise, but the carrying
out of an agency coming within the general provisions of the law."' 41
In an 1880 case, Claparede et Compagnie v. Compagnie de Remorquage de
Calais, 41 the Cour de Cassation further limited the scope of Article 420. In this
case Remorquage had provided Claparide with a captain and mechanic to take
Clapar6de's vessel from Saint-Denis to Calais. Remorquage, situated in Calais,
sued Clapar~de, domiciled at Saint-Denis, for expenses and disbursements
advanced. The suit was filed in the commercial court in Calais. The Cour de
Cassation denied the competence of the Calais court under Article 420 "since
the action of the Soci~t6 de Remorquage derives from none of the grounds
stated by this article, but from the performance either of an agency, or of a
quasi-contract for management of affairs, which are covered by general
provisions of law and cannot modify rules of competence."
'4 3
The most significant Article 420 case from the standpoint of the hypothetical
case is Compagnie des Tramways du Nord v. Vauverts." Plaintiff purchased a
round trip ticket on the defendant tramway. She alleged that she was injured
when the car in which she was riding was hit by another tram moving in the
opposite direction. The appellate court held that the commercial court of
Roubaix was not competent under Article 420 because the claim sought to be
enforced arose from a tort and not a contract. The court states: [Ilt is not
doubted that the rules of exceptional competence of this article are not
restricted to the case of sale or purchase of merchandise; that they apply still to
all commercial litigation in which it is a question of a delivery as a payment to be
made, more generally, that they apply to all obligations which arise naturally
40[1862] S. Jur. I. 427 (Cass. req.).
4 'd. at 429.
42118801 S. Jur. 1. 263 (Cass. req.).
41d.
"[18981 D.P. II. 312 (Douai Cour d'appel, Ire ch.).
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from an agreement. . . . ,45This case clearly indicates that even though there is
a contract, not every event or obligation occuring as a result of performance can
be characterized as coming within Article 420. The same court reaffirmed its
position in a later case, Deltour v. Dame Cayez-Nivis, 46 observing that Article
420 does not derogate from the general rules assigning jurisdiction to the court
of the defendant's domicile except in case of a commercial obligation arising
from a contract.
The Dalloz Rpertoire summarizes the scope of Article 420:
Article 420 applies exclusively in commercial matters, from which it follows that the
indication of a place of payment in a civil matter is not attributive of jurisdiction....
Article 420 does not derogate from the general rules of competence except in case of
commercial litigation arising from a contract....
But all disputes concerning either the interpretation or the preformance of the con-
tract are subject to Article 420, whose provisions are applicable to every action which it
concerns, even those filed after complete discharge of the respective obligations of the
parties .... ,7
Thus, it becomes significant to distinguish between obligations which- arise
from the contract and those which do not. In the hypothetical problem it is clear
that the contract itself did not expressly provide for disclosure and that such an
obligation is not imposed by French securities law. As the next section will
indicate, there is apparently no rule of French contract law that would imply a
duty to-disclose under the circumstances. Therefore, it seems quite possible that
a French court would find that Article 420 is inapplicable because the obligation
to disclose, if there is any at all, arises under a tort theory rather than contract.
VII. Duty to Disclose under Contract and Tort Principles
Even though French law governing mergers imposes no obligation on the
acquiring company to provide a statement of its financial condition, there may
be general principles of contract law imposing an obligation to disclose or
principles of tort law making it fraudulent conduct not to disclose. First, it is
important to distinguish between causes of action grounded in contract and
those based on tort.
A. Distinction Between Contract and Tort
Analysis of whether the injury complained of sounds in contract or tort is
necessary not only to determine the applicability of Article 420 but also to
establish which principles of general law might be invoked.
Mazeaud and Tunc delineate these two areas of civil responsibility as follows:
,sId.
" 1905] D.P. V. 3 (Douai Cour d'appel, Ire ch.).
4'DALLOZ RiPERTOIRE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE, Competence Commerciale,
Nos. 146-148 (1955).
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The victim may claim in contract if he has entered into a valid contract with the one
who caused the injury and if the prejudice complained of arises from the
non-discharge of a principal or incidental obligation established by the contract, or if
he can invoke a waranty given by the other contracting party. The causes of the
contract may moreover, within certain limits, not only eliminate or limit the obligation
(which is sometimes the case when there is no failure to perform the contract), but also
eliminate or limit the warranty liability.
In cases of contractual fault or warranty, the victim may not claim in tort, except in
exceptional cases in which the same act which constitutes a contractual fault consti-
tutes a tortious fault distinct and outside of the contract.
Beyond these cases, on the other hand, the victim may initiate a tort action. He may
nevertheless, within certain limits, have concluded with the one who caused the injury
an agreement which deprives him of his recourse or limits its effects.48
Essentially, there is contractual liability when there is a valid contract and the
injury complained of arises from the failure to discharge an obligation expressly
stated or implied by law in the contract. Otherwise, the injury gives rise to
noncontractual liability. Regardless of which realm of civil responsibility the
injury falls within, the same three elements of liability must be
established: damage, injury and the relationship of cause and effect between
the fault and the damage.
B. Contract
Approaching the problem from the standpoint of contract law, one could best
establish the competence of the French courts by asserting that the failure to
disclose the pending litigation in Belgium constituted concealment (rticence)
and fraud (dol) sufficient to vitiate the element of consent, thereby rendering a
French court competent to declare the contract invalid and to award the
plaintiff damages.
Article 1108 of the Civil Code establishes four conditions essential for the
validity of a contract: consent of the party to be bound; his capacity to contract;
a certain object as the basis of the engagement; and a legal cause in the
obligation. According to Article 1109, there is no valid consent if the consent is
given only by error or if it has been extracted by violence or obtained by dol
(fraud).
Dol is the aspect of fraud relating only to fraud in connection with the
execution of a contract. Dol, amounting to a civil wrong, is a basis for declaring
the contract invalid and awarding the plaintiff damages. To establish dol one
must show intentional fault imputable to the contracting party defendant. Fault
may be established by showing fraudulent schemes or misstatements or
concealment. Concealment (riticence) is the act of not speaking. It is voluntary
silence intended to create or permit a determinable error. The majority view
481 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD '9 A. TUNC, TRAITE TH9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA
RESPONSABILIT9 CIVILE DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE § 207, at 258-59 (1965).
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today is that there is concealment when one omits voluntarily something he was
obligated to reveal.49 The obligation to inform has been imposed by statute
under certain circumstances including among others the seller's obligation on
delivery to give the buyer all information indispensable and useful for the use of
the thing sold as well as hidden defects and the insured's obligation imposed by
statute to inform the insurer in connection with certain insurance contracts. 0
In recent years the courts have found nullity for reason of fraudulent
concealment in the absence of schemes or falsehoods. The difficult question,
especially in the absence of these aggravating factors, is to determine when the
obligation to speak arises. Ghestin has posed the question as follows:
Is it necessary to consider an obligation exceptional, and thus, to be excluded in the
absence of a formal text? Or can one conclude from these diverse texts, if not that a
general obligation to inform exists, which does not correspond to generally followed
practice .... at least that such an obligation could exist under certain circumstances.
It is this middle approach which the cases have followed.5"
Thus, if a specific statutory obligation can be found, there is no problem in
imposing liability for failure to speak. But the courts have further been willing
to impose liability under certain circumstances without statutory mandate. One
must look to the case law to determine the scope of liability.
The courts have shown a tendency to find liability for concealment when it is a
question of some confidential relationship, either because of the nature of the
contract or the capacity of the other party. In the former category the Cour de
Cassation found liability in a case involving formation of a company where one
of the associates failed to reveal to the other that he was subject to a court order
winding up his affairs and remained substantially indebted to his personal
creditors.52 Similarly, the court apparently found an obligation to inform
faithfully one who is being solicited to join a company by application of Civil
Code Article 1110." 3 With respect to capacity of the party, the Cour de
Cassation annulled an appointment of a notary as heir where the notary had not
told his 80-year-old client of the fact the appointment was irrevocable.54
Beyond these categories the Cour de Cassation has held a party liable for
failure to speak under more general circumstances. In Dame Haller v. Untrau55
the court upheld a decision annulling a contract for the sale of a truck when the
'3 DALLOZ ENCYCLOPEDIE JURIDIQUE-DROIT CIVIL, DOL § 25 (2d. ed. 1972).
'Old. at §§ 26-30; 1 P. LE TOURNEAU, LA R11SPONSIBILITE CIVILE § 889, at 347 (1972).
"'Ghestin, La reticence, le dol et lerreursur les qualits substantielles, [19711 D.S. Chr. 247, 248.5 Brunet v. Maniare, [1959] Bull. Civ. 111. 162.
"
3Decision of March 8, 1965 (commercial section), [1965] Bull. Civ. 111. No. 173 cited in 3 DALLO,
supra note 49, at § 28. The writer has not seen this case and is unable to relate the circumstances
under which it arose.54Consorts Deladouespe-Loyau v. Phebipeau, [1960] Bull. Civ. 1. 198.
"Decision of May 19, 1958 (Civil Section) (1958 BULL. CIV. 1. No. 251).
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seller failed to reveal the existence of a lien. The court observed: "[Tihe Cour
d'appel was able to determine from the deliberate silence of Reichstadt as to a
fact of which the buyers had no knowledge and which, if they had known it,
would have caused them not to deal, the existence of a fraud." ' 6 Similarly, the
court in Matre Dadi v. Marie7 upheld an annulment of a contract for sale of a
business where the seller failed to reveal that one of the essential assets of the
business, a patent, had been assigned to a third party. The court observed that
the presumed existence of the patent "had played a decisive role in the buyer's
decision. . . ." Finally, the court upheld the annulment of a contract for the
sale of a business where the seller failed to reveal that an essential permit was
about to expire and the government agency had no intent to renew it.5 9
Although the Cour de Cassation has been more willing to annul contracts
because of silence under general circumstances not exhibiting any special
confidential relations between the parties, it has also created defenses that
formerly would have been available only when the ground for annulment was
error rather than fraud. Thus, the court has refused annulment where the
complaining party's lack of knowledge was inexcusable, observing that
"concealment supposes that the silence of a contracting party relates to a
circumstance or a fact that the other party could be excused for not
knowing. . ".."0 Likewise, the court has indicated that silence as to a fact that
the parties did not consider essential to the conclusion of the contract is not
sufficient to obtain annulment. 61 In a recent decision, Epoux Corgnet v. Epoux
Marie, 62 however, the court backed away from the essential standard observing
that while "fraud may result from the silence of a party, . . . the error caused
by the fraud may be taken into consideration, even when it does not bear on the
substance of the thing, since it gave rise to the consent of the other contracting
party. "63
Applying the case law to the facts of the hypothetical problem, one cannot
give a definitive answer on the attitude of the French courts toward the failure of
Bote to reveal the pending litigation. The cases indicating liability of promoters
for failure to inform fully those who initially subscribe for stock are useful in
that the merger situation is somewhat analogous-it is a question of bringing in
"Id.
"'[19591 Bull. Civ. 1II. 100.
5
'Id. at 101.
"Decision of October 27, 1965 (commercial section), [19651 Bull, Civ. III. No. 534 cited in 3
DALLOZ, supra note 49. at § 28. The text of the decision was not available to the writer but it is also
discussed in Chevallier, Obligations et contrats spciaux, 64 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
CIVIL 529, 530 (1966).
°OIpoux Baroux v. Consorts Guernier, [19541 J.C.P. 1I. 8384 (Cass. soc.). See also Avocat v.
Compagnie auxiliaire d'entreprise du livre "C.E.A.L." J. Delmas et Cie, [19621 Bull. Civ. IV. 276.
"'Giron v. Consorts Rocher, [19531 Bull. Civ. I. 221.
11[19671 Bull. Civ. 1. 43.
131d. at 43-44.
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new shareholders. A notable difference in the merger situation, however, is that
those who are being invited into the acquiring company are represented by their
own entity, the acquired company, and are not in the position of having to deal
directly with the acquirer. In short, the shareholders of the acquired company
may not be viewed as needing as much protection as individual investors. It is
encouraging that the Cour de Cassation does not tie liability to a showing of
confidential relations between the parties, but if the defense of inexcusable error
were permitted, it might well be argued and accepted that two corporations
dealing on an arm's-length basis are obligated to investigate and should
discover a matter so important as pending litigation for one quarter of the
acquiring company's assets. Thus, while the case law on concealment is
uncertain, there is a substantial possibility that a French court would be
competent in a claim for fraud and concealment under the hypothetical facts.
C. Noncontractual Liability (Tort)
The basic provision of noncontractual liability is Article 1382 of the Civil
Code which provides: "Every act whatever of man, which causes injury to
another, obligates the one by whose fault the injury occurred, to repair it."
Although Article 1382 does not specifically refer to fault by omission, it is well
established in French law that omission is included. 64 Furthermore, the fact
that Boite is a corporation does not affect the applicability of 1382 since the
word "man" is interpreted not only to include natural persons but also legal
entities committing a fault giving rise to damage.
65
Carbonnier distinguishes three kinds of fault by omission. There is omission
in the act which is failure to act in connection with some broader activity
initiated by the one who fails to act. Carbonnier cites as examples the
automobile driver who having reached excessive speed fails to brake at the
decisive moment and the worker who having made an excavation in a public way
fails to mark it with a warning light at night. 66 As he describes it, this area of
liability is negligence by omission. 67 The facts of the hypothetical case do not
appear to give rise to this kind of liability although it is quite possible that the
failure to disclose pending litigation under circumstances in which Boite
undertook to disclose contingent liabilities and neglected to mention the
pending suit would create liability.
Next is failure to act while under a legal obligation to act; for example, the
failure of an automobile driver to turn on his headlights after nightfall. 68 As has
'See 4 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL § 93, at 330-31 (7th ed. 1972); 1 H. MAZEAUD, supra note
48, § 524, at 623.
112 H. MAZEAuD, L. MAZEAuD& J. MAZEAuD, TRArri THgORIQUE Er PRATIQUE DE LA RgSPONSA-
BILTE CIVILE DEqLICTUELLE ET CONTRACrUELLE § 1986, at 1124 (6th ed. 1970).
114 J. CARBONNIER supra note 64, § 93, at 331.
"Id. at 330.
"Id. at 331.
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already been seen, no specific French statute such as the law governing mergers
and securities transactions and no general principle of French contract law
imposes a legal obligation to act. Thus, this provision is not very useful.
Finally, there is failure to act in the absence of any legal obligation to act but
with intention to injure.69 Carbonnier observes that failure to act with intent to
injure always constitutes fault but that in the absence of an intention to injure,
the failure to act does not constitute fault except where an obligation to act is
imposed by law, rules or regulations, even not written, of the trade. Establishing
intention to injure under the hypothetical facts is difficult because the judgment
had not been rendered at the time of the merger; the liability was only
contingent. If additional facts were available indicating that Boite's
management felt that there was a strong possibility that the judgment would go
against the company and that they sought the merger with the idea of increasing
assets to absorb the impact of an unfavorable decision in the pending litigation,
changes of establishing liability under French law would be enhanced. But in
any case, the standard of intention to injure puts a rather difficult burden of
proof on the plaintiff.
Since the judgment against Boite was handed down just three days after the
consummation of the merger, one could argue that Boite management was
motivated by fear of an unfavorable judgment. Thus, of the noncontractual
theories of liability, omission in the act and omission with intention to injure are
the most likely grounds of establishing French court competence, providing that
additional facts could be established.
VIII. Conclusion
The object of this discussion, of course, is to determine whether the client S
will be able to enforce his New York federal district court judgment in France.
The hypothetical problem focuses on the question of whether the French
enforcing court would find the New York court competent for the purpose of
enforcement of its judgment in France. While it is possible that the French
court would look only to United States law in determining the competence of the
New York court, there is no statute compelling such a resolution of the issue.
The case law is uncertain, there having been no definitive word from the Cour
de Cassation on the question. Thus, S must be advised that he will have to be
prepared to establish, under the older theory of foreign court competence in
exequatur proceedings, that a French court would have been competent if the
events complained of, which by hypothesis took place in New York, had taken
place in France.
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As the foregoing analysis has indicated, French substantive law does not
clearly give a cause of action for the failure of an acquiring company in a merger
transaction to inform the shareholders of the acquired company of pending
litigation against the acquiring company. Such action is surely not compelled
under French securities law. It also seems clear that it would be difficult to cast
the obligation to disclose in the form of a contractual obligation such that a
French court would have been competent under Article 420 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Undoubtedly, the most promising area of French law for the
imposition of liability under the circumstances is the law of contract.
Specifically, the favored theory is fraud or concealment preventing formation of
a contract. French courts have imposed on the seller a duty to speak, even in
arm's length transactions, but not in a merger case in particular. Given the fact
that the French have not really recognized the disclosure ideal as the guiding
light of securities regulation, one must be somewhat skeptical that the court
would be anxious to protect the shareholder under the circumstances. Finally, a
cause of action in tort for omission to act will be difficult as it appears the
plaintiff would have the burden of proving defendant's intent to injure.
Most importantly, the hypothetical problem illustrates the broad discretion of
the French court faced with a request to enforce a foreign judgment on a cause
of action not clearly recognized under French law. The Cour de Cassation in
Munzer abolished review on the merits in proceedings for enforcement of
foreign judgments, but in a case like the hypothetical, it is apparent that the
merits are still within reach of the court in the guise of the competence
requirement.
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